【报告主题】The Captain's Secret Lifeboat: Evidence from CEO Compensation Policy
【主讲嘉宾】ZOU Hong，Rutgers University
【报告时间】2026年6月9日 14:00
【报告地点】会计学院108室
【内容提要】
Using hand-collected data from proxy statements for a comprehensive sample of U.S. firms, we examine how requiring firms to disclose whether they allow executives to hedge the downside risk of their company shareholdings affects CEO compensation policy. Employing a difference-in-differences design, we find that treatment firms reduce the proportion of stock awards and increase the share of option grants in CEO compensation, with no change in total pay levels. This shift in compensation policy is concentrated among firms with weaker governance. The disclosure requirement appears to have led to certain reduced risk-taking and increased earnings management. Compared with the matched control group and other treatment firms, treatment firms fetched higher stock valuations when their CEOs did not reduce share ownership around the disclosure mandate. We find very little significant change in other firm outcomes over our relatively short analysis window. Overall, the evidence points to both the benefits and some unintended effects of the disclosure requirement.