时间：2014年5月13日（周二）下午3:00pm--4:30pm 地点：会计学院108会议室 报告人：高华声 南洋理工大学 主持人：周波 题目: Labor Market Competition, Executive Job-hopping, and Compensation Paper Abstract: Although various optimal contracting models predict that competition for managerial talents explains the growth of executive compensation, there is little empirical evidence. We examine this prediction from the perspective of executive job-hopping. Companies dramatically raise their incumbent executives’ pay, especially equity-based pay, after losing executives to other firms. The pay raise is more pronounced when the incumbent executives have better employment mobility in the labor market, when the companies have strong corporate governance, and when the companies lose high-ranking executives to nearby industry rivals. Overall, this paper provides supporting evidence that competition for top executives drives up executive compensation. 附件为本次报告文章。 高教授的个人主页：http://www3.ntu.edu.sg/home/hsgao/
