【报告主题】The Economics of Pay Versus Performance: Early Evidence on CEO Incentives and Shareholder Wealth
【主讲嘉宾】Ying Gan，Erasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands
【报告时间】2026年5月19日 14:00
【报告地点】会计学院108室
【内容提要】
We provide early evidence on the SEC’s most recent compensation reform—the Pay Versus Performance (PvP) disclosure rules. Using a sample of 652 U.S. public firms, our analysis shows that 97% of firms select accounting-based metrics as their firm-specific PvP measure - defined as the firm’s self-selected ‘most important’metric for executive pay. Over half align their PvP measure with annual bonus-plan metrics, and most do so consistently over time, indicating that opportunistic “metric shopping’ is less prevalent. Firms that exceed their PvP performance targets demonstrate substantial improvements in shareholder value creation, proxied by total shareholder return, share return, and market value. Moreover, we show that the new disclosure of Compensation Actually Paid (CAP), which adjusts reported total pay to incorporate annual changes in the fair value of equity awards, consistently exhibits far greater sensitivity to firm performance compared to total compensation, lending support to the SEC’s disclosure framework. By documenting the economic relevance of CAP and PvP measures, our findings highlight how the SEC’s disclosure reform improves the ability of investors and regulators to assess the pay–performance sensitivity of CEO compensation.