上海财经大学会计与财务研究院
科 研 成 果 简 报
2020年第2期（总第40期）2020年12月
一、 重大项目阶段性成果
◆《简政放权与会计、财务问题研究》
（一）项目基本情况
（1）项目来源：国家教育部人文社会科学重大研究项目
（2）主持人：靳庆鲁
（3）所在单位：上海财经大学会计与财务研究院
（4）预期完成期限：2018.07—2020.12
（5）项目批准号：18JJD790010
（二）项目研究进展情况
课题组基于拟定的研究计划持续推进相关研究工作。目前已在国内权威期刊《经济学（季刊）》《会计研究》《南开管理评论》《财务研究》《金融研究》《财经研究》发表论文6篇。
阶段性成果一：恒产者恒心：“原罪”嫌疑、产权保护与民营企业绩效（《经济学（季刊）》，2020年03期 ）
本文从产权保护视角考察民营企业家原罪嫌疑对其所经营企业绩效的影响。研究发现:与创业型企业相比,国有转制型民营企业的绩效显著较差;这一现象在产权保护较差地区更为明显。在郎顾之争事件中,国有转制型企业的市场反应显著差于创业型企业;而当最高人民法院宣布再审三起重大产权案件时,其市场反应则显著更好;《物权法》施行后,两类企业绩效差异显著缩小;此外,国有转制型企业更多地通过关联交易转移资源且创新投入较少。
阶段性成果二：事前披露能够降低董监高减持的获利能力吗?——基于中国“减持新规”的实证检验（《金融研究》，2020年第3期）
事前披露能否降低董监高交易的信息优势?中国证监会于2017年5月修订并实施的减持新规首次为上述命题的检验提供了独特的研究场景。通过事件研究法,本文对减持新规颁布前后的董监高减持行为进行研究,考察事前披露减持计划是否会削弱董监高减持时的信息优势。实证结果表明,减持新规实施后董监高减持的短期超常回报显著低于减持新规实施前,这说明事前披露会抑制董监高交易的择时能力。进一步研究发现,当公司信息质量较差、所处地区的市场化程度较低、成长性较高、减持规模较大时,事前披露对董监高减持获利能力的削弱作用更强;减持新规实施对董监高减持超常回报的削弱主要体现在交易日与减持计划披露日间隔短的减持样本中。本文不仅在实证层面上验证了事前披露可以降低董监高交易的信息优势,丰富了内部人交易研究文献,也为我国减持新规的实施效果提供了证据和建议。
阶段性成果三：网络基础设施建设与企业技术知识扩散——来自“宽带中国”战略的准自然实验（《财经研究》，2020年04期 ）
党的十九大报告明确指出要发展数字经济,建设网络强国,抢抓全球新一轮产业竞争制高点,促进实体经济加快转型升级。在此背景下,解答网络基础设施能否以及如何影响微观企业的信息传递和技术知识扩散,具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。文章利用宽带中国战略的准自然实验和2008-2017年上市公司数据进行了实证分析。研究发现,良好的网络基础设施不仅可以促进上市公司向内部子公司的技术知识扩散,还可以促进与外部其他公司的技术合作。前者表现为注册地被选为宽带中国示范城市后,当地上市公司下属子公司的创新水平显著上升,后者则体现为当地上市公司与其他公司的联合创新显著增加。进一步研究表明,当上市公司的技术水平较高,或者子公司的地理位置较分散、网络基础设施较完备时,网络基础设施对公司内部技术知识扩散的积极作用更大;而当上市公司技术水平较高或者所在地区互联网用户较多时,网络基础设施对公司之间技术创新合作的影响更大。可见,加大网络基础设施的建设力度,有利于发挥技术知识的正外部性。
阶段性成果四：非正式信息传递机制能降低公司权益融资成本吗？——基于企业家微博的实证检验（《财经研究》，2020年第11期）
移动互联网时代,社交媒体日渐成为信息传递的重要渠道。作为社交媒体之一的微博为企业家从幕后走向台前提供了一条低成本且极便捷的通道。不同于以主流媒体为代表的正式信息传递机制,企业家微博具有明显的非正式特征。文章研究了企业家微博这一非正式信息传递机制对企业权益融资成本的影响。结果表明:(1)企业家微博发布与其所在企业的权益融资成本显著负相关。微博发布条数、评论条数以及转发条数越多,企业权益融资成本下降越明显。(2)企业家微博对权益融资成本的影响在市场化程度低的地区以及企业外部信息环境薄弱的情况下更加显著。(3)与企业不直接相关的个性化微博和与企业直接相关的披露式微博都与权益融资成本显著负相关,而个性化微博比例越高,越有利于降低权益融资成本。艾特(@)他人的数量越多,或者正向情感倾向的内容比例越高,企业权益融资成本下降越明显。在自媒体快速发展的时代,文章丰富了非正式信息传递机制经济后果的研究,为企业家选择信息传递方式和渠道提供了重要参考。
阶段性成果五：我国产业政策的制度发展与实证发现——基于企业财务行为视角的研究展望（《财务研究》，2019年第1期）
近年来,产业政策引起了学术界与实务界的热烈讨论。基于政府与市场关系的视角,本文对产业政策的核心理论、制度背景以及实证发现进行了系统回顾,并在此基础上梳理了研究脉络。最后,本文结合中国的制度特征,提出了产业政策与企业财务行为领域潜在的研究方向。
阶段性成果六：影响公司高管交易行为内部差异的因素：“信息优势”还是“收入补偿动机”（《南开管理评论》，2019年第6期）
本文以2003-2017上市公司高管交易为研究对象，采用公司内高管相对薪酬水平作为“信息优势”和“收入补偿动机”的双重代理变量，考察了公司高管交易行为内部差异的可能影响因素。研究发现，高管在公司的薪酬相对水平越高，其交易的主动性越强，买卖股票的超常回报特别是短期回报越高。这一关系并不因信息环境变化而发生改变，表明公司内不同高管买卖股票的主动性和交易回报的差异主要由信息优势决定，而内部薪酬差异引起的收入补偿动机并未产生决定性影响。
阶段性成果七：社会性负担与公司财务困境动态——基于ST制度的考察（《会计研究》，2018年第11期）
本文基于政治锦标赛的分析框架，以ST制度为切入点，考察了社会性负担的承担（以行业平均收入与平均雇员规模为基础测算公司超额雇员率）对公司未来财务状况的动态影响。研究结果表明，社会性负担的承担显著提升了公司未来财务困境（表现为被ST）的概率，因而支持了基于市场竞争的“优胜劣汰效应”。进一步的研究表明，地方政府干预程度显著增强了公司社会性负担与公司未来财务困境的正向关系，但国有产权背景并未显著降低公司社会性负担与公司未来财务困境的正向关系。此外，对于ST公司，业已承担的社会性负担形成的预算软约束有助于企业短期实现“摘帽”，但并未从根本上改变公司未来反复出现的财务困境。本文从社会性负担的视角阐释了转型经济中政府与企业间的互动关系，对当前深化政府改革，厘清政企关系具有重要的政策含义。
◆《新闻媒体报道与会计、财务问题研究》
（一）项目基本情况
（1）项目来源：国家教育部人文社会科学重大研究项目
（2）主持人：李增泉
（3）所在单位：上海财经大学会计与财务研究院
（4）预期完成期限：2018.1—2020.12
（5）项目批准号：18JJD79001
（二）项目研究进展情况
本项目立项后，严格按照项目研究规划开展科学研究，围绕财经媒体报道偏差的制度诱因和经济后果等相关问题开展系列研究分析。针对“财经报道选择性偏差诱因”，研究团队继续基于媒体报道的供给和需求，对前序的政府行为、客户以及机构投资者三个角度对媒体报道偏差形成的诱因进行了更为深入的研究与探讨。目前项目团队正基于理论框架对媒体报道偏差形成的原因进行了案例和数据分析。团队通过采用数据挖掘和文本分析的技术，基本完成了模块一的数据搜集整理工作。此外，团队将继续在测度媒体报道偏差程度的指标方面进行深入研究与测度。针对“媒体报道选择性偏差的经济后果”，研究团队着眼于媒体报道对上市公司行为和治理机制的影响展开了系列研究，研究主题包括企业的产品召回、富豪榜信息披露以及分析师个人形象等，形成了一些阶段性研究成果，已有多项成果发表/接收于国内外权威会计学期刊《The Accounting Review》《Management Science》《管理世界》《会计研究》及《China Journal of Accounting Studies》等。此外还有数篇工作论文正在创作中，部分已完成初稿，准备修改投稿国际权威会计学期刊。
阶段性成果一：Analysts’Beauty and Performance（《Management Science》，在线发表）
We study whether sell-side financial analysts’ physical attractiveness is associated with their job performance. We find that attractive analysts make more accurate earnings forecasts than less attractive analysts. Moreover, more attractive analysts make stock recommendations that are more informative in the short run and more profitable in the long run. Further analyses reveal that attractive analysts attain their better job performance at least partly through their privileged access to information from firm management. For the sources of the beauty effect, we find that more attractive analysts gain more media exposure, have better connections to institutional investors, and receive more internal support from their employers. Additional evidence suggests that analysts’ physical appearance per se at least partly explains our findings. Overall, our study demonstrates that physical attractiveness has a profound impact on the job performance and information access of sell-side financial analysts.
阶段性成果二：The political economy of labor‐employment decisions: Evidence from China（《Management Science》，Vol. 66, No. 10,2020）
In China’s transitional economy, one of the major objectives of the government is to maintain social stability. We hypothesize that, through state ownership and appointment of executives, Chinese government officials can influence firms’ labor-employment decisions by limiting layoffs when firms’ sales decline. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have stickier labor costs than non-SOEs, and the presence of politically connected managers makes labor costs even stickier in SOEs while having little effect in non-SOEs. Such effects are stronger in regions with weak market institutions and during time periods when government officials are to be promoted. We also show that the government reciprocates SOEs’ sticky labor policies with subsequent subsidies.
阶段性成果三：East, West, Home's Best: Do Local CEOs Behave Less Myopically?（《The Accounting Review》，Volume 95，Issue2, 2020 ）
We test whether CEOs working near their childhood homes are less likely than nonlocal CEOs to make myopic decisions. Place attachment theories suggest that people develop mutual caretaking relationships with their birthplaces. Also, executive labor markets face less information asymmetry about local CEOs, resulting in lower pressure on local CEOs for quick profits. Consistent with the prediction, we find that local CEOs are less likely to cut R&D expenditures for beating analyst forecasts or avoiding earnings decreases. In their last year of office, local CEOs are significantly less likely to cut R&D than nonlocal CEOs. The CEO locality effect is stronger when more local business interests are embedded in the firm and when the residents of the CEO's birth state have stronger local social bonds. Local CEOs' longer horizons are consistently manifested in their other decisions, such as paying more state tax and being more socially responsible in business operation.
阶段性成果四：Information dissemination through embedded financial analysts: Evidence from China （《The Accounting Review》，Volume 95，Issue2, 2020 ）
When emerging market firms disclose relationship-based transactions, they face a tradeoff in which greater transparency may help lower their cost of capital at the cost of revealing proprietary information. We find that firms overcome this challenge by relying on analysts within their private networks (i.e., connected analysts) who, through repeated interaction with the firm, can better verify relationship-based transactions. Using Chinese firms, we show that firms with more connected analysts have more accurate consensus forecasts and lower forecast dispersion. When a connected analyst departs and stops covering a firm, the accuracy and informativeness of the unconnected analysts’ forecasts decrease, suggesting that information spills over from the connected analyst to analysts outside the network. We find a potential mechanism for this information spillover: communication through common institutional clients. The findings suggest that embedded financial analysts—those who share close connections with firms and analysts—serve as a channel for disseminating proprietary, hard-to-verify information.
阶段性成果五：Friends in Need are Friends Indeed: An Analysis of Social Ties between Financial Analysts and Mutual Fund Managers（《The Accounting Review》，Volume 94,Issue 1,2019）
We examine how hometown, school, and workplace ties between financial analysts and mutual fund managers affect their business decisions. We show that a fund manager is more likely to hold stocks covered by analysts with whom she is socially connected and that she also makes higher profits from these holdings. Such social tie-related holding returns are higher among more opaque firms. In return, a fund manager tends to cast her star analyst votes in favor of her connected analysts and her fund company is more likely to allocate trading commissions to her connected analysts’ brokerages. Additional tests indicate that analysts more actively acquire information (through conducting corporate site visits) and issue more optimistically biased recommendations for stocks held by fund managers with whom they are connected. Overall, our results illustrate the pronounced influence of social networks on the behaviors of analysts and fund managers.
阶段性成果六：Litigation Risk and Corporate Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Two Quasi-Natural Experiments（《European Accounting Review》，Volume 28，Issue 5, 2019 ）
We examine the effect of litigation risk on corporate voluntary disclosure using two quasi-natural experiments, which have substantial and opposing impacts on the litigation risk of firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit. We find that firms in the Ninth Circuit decrease (increase) the quantity and quality of their voluntary disclosure, relative to control firms, when their litigation risk is lowered (elevated). The pre-treatment test shows an indistinguishable trend between treatment and control firms. A battery of robustness checks indicates that our results are not driven by alternative explanations. We hypothesize and find that the impact of litigation risk is more pronounced when firms have bad news and that firms are more likely to preempt bad news through voluntary disclosures when litigation risk is elevated. Overall, results from both experiments suggest that litigation risk causally increases corporate voluntary disclosure.
阶段性成果七：Does the rhetoric always hide bad intention: annual report’s tone and stock crash risk（《China Journal of Accounting Studies》，2018, VOL. 6, NO. 2）
In this paper, by examining the relationship between tone and stock crash risk, we investigate whether tone embedded in annual reports transmits information to the market or it is just a way of impressing management. We consider the optimism of tone as the construct of public information received by investors, and the truthfulness of tone as the construct of private information held by the management, respectively. We find that, overall, the optimism of tone in the annual report has no significant impact on stock crash risk in the year following the release of the annual report. However, after taking the truthfulness of tone into account, we find that when the tone is not true, the stock crash risk in the following year will increase if tone becomes more optimistic, indicating that an overly positive tone is likely to be the result of management hiding some bad news or releasing false good news for their self-interest. On the other hand, when the tone in annual reports is true, the positive correlation between tone and crash risk will be significantly suppressed, indicating that positive language expresses managers’ real thoughts, without bad intention.
阶段性成果八：Minimum Wages and Labor-cost Stickiness: Evidence from China（《中国会计与财务研究》，2019年第21卷第4期）
In this study, we examine the effect of minimum wages on labour cost stickiness by using a sample of 20,566 firm-year observations from China, which had no minimum wage legislation until 2004. We find that minimum wages are positively associated with labour cost stickiness, suggesting an enhancement effect. The results of further analyses show that the positive effect is mainly driven by the per capita salary stickiness and is more pronounced 1) among firms with lower per capita wages and those located in provinces with higher minimum wage growth and 2) in the post-2008 period, during which China’s Labour Contract Law was in effect.
阶段性成果九：资本市场信息披露、关系型合约与供需长鞭效应——基于供应链信息外溢的经验证据（《管理世界》，2020年07期）
文章利用手工收集的2007～2016年间7997组客户—供应商均为上市公司的多级供应链条数据,考察客户公司信息披露对供应商生产行为的影响,以及资本市场公共信息环境和私有信息沟通的调节效应。研究发现:(1)客户信息披露质量越高,供应商与其供需波动偏离度的长鞭效应越低;当溯至再上游时,这一外溢效应依然存在,表明客户信息披露具有明显的治理效应;(2)所在行业证券化率越大,或者上下游存在战略采购协议时,客户公司信息披露的治理效应弱化,说明行业层面信息搜寻或交易双方关系型缔结提供了替代性的信息渠道;(3)进一步研究发现,客户采购比例越大,其信息披露的治理效应越强,同行信息搜寻与私有信息沟通的替代效应越弱。控制内生性问题后,以上结论仍然成立。本文为资本市场公共信息披露通过供应链传导到实体经济这一特殊机制提供了经验证据,为完善公共执法和通过责任规则促进私人履约提供了理论依据。
阶段性成果十：高管晋升与企业税负—来自中国地方国有上市公司的经验证据（《会计研究》，2019年04期）
本文选取2003—2014年中国沪深两市A股地方国有上市公司为样本,实证考察了企业税负承担与高管晋升之间的关系。研究发现,地方国有企业税负承担与高管晋升呈显著正相关关系,即积极的税负承担有助于增加高管晋升概率,存在税负晋升激励效应。进一步研究发现,税负晋升激励效应受企业层级和高管异质性的影响,省属国有企业、高管越年轻、任期越短,税负晋升激励效应越显著。本文从企业税负视角,发现了影响国有企业高管晋升的新证据,为完善国有企业高管考核机制提供有益的借鉴和启示。
阶段性成果十一：环境污染曝光与公司价值——理论机制与实证检验（《金融研究》，2019年08期）
环境污染及其治理问题日益被全社会所重视。在此背景下,本文实证考察企业环境污染曝光是否影响公司价值以及影响机制。以发生于2005-2015年间的71起上市公司环境污染曝光事件为样本,本文研究发现:上市公司环境污染事件曝光当天,市值平均下跌1.51%。进一步分析发现:公司在污染事件曝光后,更容易受到政府的环保监管和处罚,且更难获得银行债务融资;并且,环保监管与债务融资的变化与污染事件窗口期公司股票的累计超额报酬率显著相关,表明投资者对于环境污染给公司造成的不利后果具有理性预期并相应地做出了负面反应。此外,2010年政府环保政策趋严后,污染事件曝光后政府监管力度的上升和债务融资的减少都更为明显;在公众环保需求高的地区,污染事件曝光后政府环保监管力度上升更显著。总之,本文的研究表明,环境污染事件曝光会降低公司价值,且政府监管力度上升和债务融资困难是环境污染曝光降低公司价值的两个重要作用机制。本文揭示了环境污染曝光对公司价值的负面影响以及影响的机制和异质性,对于当前的环境治理和经济转型具有较好的政策启示意义。
二、 学术论文
（一）The political economy of labor‐employment decisions: Evidence from China《Management Science》，Vol66,No10,2020| Zhaoyang Gu,唐松,Donghui Wu
【摘要】In China's transitional economy, one of the major objectives of the government is to maintain social stability. We hypothesize that, through state ownership and appointment of executives, Chinese government officials can influence firms' labor employment decisions by limiting layoffs when firms' sales decline. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have stickier labor costs than non-SOEs, and the presence of politically connected managers makes labor costs even stickier in SOEs while having little effect in non-SOEs. Such effects are stronger in regions with weak market institutions and during time periods when government officials are to be promoted. We also show that the government reciprocates SOEs' sticky labor policies with subsequent subsidies.
【基金】Ministry of Education Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Science in University 18JJD790011.
（二）The “home bias” of corporate subsidiary locations
《Journal of Corporate Finance》，Vol62,2020| Yunsen Chen,Jianqiao Huang,Sheng Xiao,赵子夜
【摘要】Analyzing hand-collected data on the corporate subsidiary locations of all publicly listed firms in China, we find that hometown firms, firms headquartered in the hometown of the key political leaders of the province, set up more subsidiaries in their home provinces. This effect is stronger for hometown firms that are non-state owned or without political connections, and more prominent in a political turnover year and the previous year. After a hometown firm sets up more subsidiaries in a key political leader's home province, the firm will enjoy more preferential government policies such as those related to subsidies and taxes. We find evidence consistent with the positive externalities of these subsidiaries for other firms in the cities where they reside, i.e., local firms. The number of these subsidiaries is also positively associated with the local employment rate. Various causality tests and robustness checks confirm the validity of our results. Our results provide some of the first evidence on the importance of corporate subsidiary locations, showing political geography significantly influences corporate geography.
【基金】MOE Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Science in University 16JJD790037.
（三）Bureaucrats as managers and their roles in corporate diversification
《Journal of Corporate Finance》，Vol62,2020| Joseph Fan,黄俊,Felix Oberholzer-Gee,Mengxin Zhao
【摘要】We examine the diversification choices and financial performance of companies run by former bureaucrats in China. We find that the ex-bureaucrat led companies are involved in more diversified business lines than other firms managed by professionals without such government backgrounds. While former bureaucrats that manage state-owned enterprises (SOEs) tend to operate in unattractive industries, those who manage private firms do businesses in more profitable, faster-growing, and more related industries. The diversification of private firms is helped by additional borrowing capacity brought in by ex-bureaucrat CEOs, while no such financing effect is found in SOEs. The overall diversification performance associated with bureaucrat CEOs is positive in private firms, but not in SOEs. As manifested by the different diversification strategies and outcomes between private firms and SOEs, the government-linked CEOs facilitate transfers of critical business resources that benefit either owners' or governments' goals. Published by Elsevier B.V.
【基金】MOE Project for Key Research Institutes of Humanities and Social Science in Universities 16JJD790037.
（四）Tailoring the Weights of Objective versus Subjective Performance Measures between Top Management and Middle Managers: Evidence from Performance-Based Equity Incentive Plans
《Journal of Management Accounting Research》，Vol. 32, No. 3,2020| Clara Xiaoling Chen,高永靖,王悦,薛爽
【摘要】This study examines the determinants of performance measurement tailoring between top management and middle managers in compensation contracts. Theoretically, while tailoring potentially enhances the informativeness of performance measures for top management and middle managers respectively, it may reduce the incentives for the two parties to coordinate with each other. We expect a firm’s decision to tailor performance measurement between top management and middle managers to be driven by this cost-benefit trade-off. Using hand-collected data from performance-based equity incentive plans from Chinese public firms, we find evidence consistent with the predictions derived from our theoretical framework. Specifically, we find that the likelihood that a firm tailors the weights on objective versus subjective performance measures between top and middle managers increases with competition intensity, non-price competition, environmental uncertainty, and CEO power, and decreases with organizational stability and growth opportunity. Furthermore, we find that suboptimal tailoring decisions are associated with higher management turnover
【基金】We gratefully acknowledge fifinancial support from the Ministry of Education Funds for Key Research Institutes of Humanities and Social Science in Chinese Universities (No. 15JJD630008, No. 16JJD790038).
（五）Short-selling and cost of equity: evidence from China
《Accounting and Finance》，Vol. 60, No. 4,2020| 胡宁,卢思绮,Tao Ma,叶建芳
【摘要】This study examines the determinants of performance measurement tailoring between top management and middle managers in compensation contracts. Theoretically, while tailoring potentially enhances the informativeness of performance measures for top management and middle managers respectively, it may reduce the incentives for the two parties to coordinate with each other. We expect a firm’s decision to tailor performance measurement between top management and middle managers to be driven by this cost-benefit trade-off. Using hand-collected data from performance-based equity incentive plans from Chinese public firms, we find evidence consistent with the predictions derived from our theoretical framework. Specifically, we find that the likelihood that a firm tailors the weights on objective versus subjective performance measures between top and middle managers increases with competition intensity, non-price competition, environmental uncertainty, and CEO power, and decreases with organizational stability and growth opportunity. Furthermore, we find that suboptimal tailoring decisions are associated with higher management turnover
【基金】Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MHESR)16JJD790038
（六）Can Online Annual General Meetings Increase Shareholders’ Participation in Corporate Governance?
《Financial Management》，Vol. 49, No. 4,2020| Gao Huasheng,黄俊,Zhang Tianshu
【摘要】We find that annual shareholder meetings conducted online can significantly increase the participation of shareholders, especially minority shareholders. This finding is more evident when the cost of physically attending the annual meeting is higher and when the firm's ownership is more dispersed. We further document significant positive stock returns when firms initiate annual online meetings. We also find that such online meetings help improve corporate governance. Overall, we provide evidence that online shareholder meetings provide shareholders a cost-effective way to participate in governance issues.
【基金】MOE Project for Key Research Institutes of Humanities and Social Science in Universities 16JJD790037
（七）The Disincentive Effect of Stars: Evidence From Analyst Coverage
《Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance》，Vol. 35(4) 8,2020| Jiang Luo,阴慧芳,Huai Zhang
【摘要】We hypothesize that when the winning odds are eclipsed by the presence of superstars, tournament participants will choose to bow out of the competition. We use the setting of financial analysts to test this hypothesis. We document that nonstar analysts avoid direct competition with star analysts through their coverage decisions. Moreover, nonstars’ reluc[1]tance to compete with stars is more pronounced when star analysts are more highly ranked, when winning the tournament carries higher rewards, when institutional ownership is lower, when the firm faces lower uncertainties, and when nonstars are of average ability. In addition, we show that nonstars who avoid direct competitions with stars are more likely to become an Institutional Investor All-star in the future, suggesting that competition avoidance benefits nonstars. Collectively, our results suggest that the presence of super[1]stars discourages others from participating in the tournament.
【基金】supported by Shanghai Education Development Foundation and Shanghai Municipal Education Commission, and from the MOE project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Science in University (No. 16JJD790037).
（八）Market liberalization and tax avoidance: Evidence from the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect Program in China
《Economic Systems》，卷: 44 期: 3，蒋德权,Weiping Li(外),Yongjian Shen(外),Zhenye Yao(外)
【摘要】This study employs two market liberalization programs in China, the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect (SHSC) program and the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect (SZHSC) program, as an exogenous shock to stock market liberalization to explore the impact of market liberalization on tax avoidance. By employing the staggered difference-in-difference regression on Chinese listed firms, we found that market liberalization reduces tax avoidance by approximately 13.1%. This result is robust under parallel trend examination, falsification test, alternative regression methodology, and different measurements for tax avoidance. Additionally, this effect is greater for non-state-owned firms and for firms that have less external monitoring, higher information asymmetry, and stronger financial constraints.
【基金】MOE Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Science in University 16JJD790037
（9）资本市场信息披露、关系型合约与供需长鞭效应——基于供应链信息外溢的经验证据
《管理世界》，2020年7期，杨志强(外),唐松,李增泉
【摘要】2016年间7997组客户—供应商均为上市公司的多级供应链条数据,考察客户公司信息披露对供应商生产行为的影响,以及资本市场公共信息环境和私有信息沟通的调节效应。研究发现:(1)客户信息披露质量越高,供应商与其供需波动偏离度的长鞭效应越低;当溯至再上游时,这一外溢效应依然存在,表明客户信息披露具有明显的治理效应;(2)所在行业证券化率越大,或者上下游存在战略采购协议时,客户公司信息披露的治理效应弱化,说明行业层面信息搜寻或交易双方关系型缔结提供了替代性的信息渠道;(3)进一步研究发现,客户采购比例越大,其信息披露的治理效应越强,同行信息搜寻与私有信息沟通的替代效应越弱。控制内生性问题后,以上结论仍然成立。本文为资本市场公共信息披露通过供应链传导到实体经济这一特殊机制提供了经验证据,为完善公共执法和通过责任规则促进私人履约提供了理论依据。
【基金】教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目（批准号：18JJD790011）的资助;
（10）资产减值信息与宏观经济预测
《经济学季刊》，20卷第1期，叶康涛(外),庄汶资(外),孙苇杭
【摘要】基于中国上市公司2008—2014年的季度数据,本文发现,全体上市公司的加总资产减值损失与未来季度的GDP增长率显著负相关,但是地方政府GDP数据操纵行为和上市公司盈余操纵行为显著削弱了资产减值信息的宏观经济预测作用。本文结论表明,上市公司的资产减值信息可以成为一个有效且及时的宏观经济先行指标,但地方政府GDP数据操纵行为和企业盈余操纵行为降低了资产减值信息的宏观决策有用性.
（11）财务报告中的市场化地理偏向和经济后果
《会计研究》，2020.8，赵子夜,吴秋君(外),陈坚波(外)
【摘要】公司既可以向高市场化的地区拓展业务ꎬ在交易成本较低的环境中获得成功ꎬ也可以在低市场化地区弥补市场制度的真空从而排他性地创造财富ꎮ那么中国公司的经营实务反映了哪一种逻辑呢? 本文采用文本检索技术在中国地区存在市场化差异的实验环境中考察了这一问题ꎮ结果表明ꎬ财务报告中低市场化地区的提及频率越高ꎬ市场反应越好ꎬ这一结果在非国有公司中更为明显ꎮ后续的测试表明ꎬ低市场化地区的提及与公司下一期托宾ＣＥＯ的薪酬以及公司下期申请的专利数量正相关ꎮ但是高市场化地区的提及和短期回报、托宾Ｑ和ＣＥＯ高管薪酬都不相关ꎮ同时ꎬ我们没有发现公司向低度市场化地区拓展业务的行为会引起政府补贴的增加ꎮ综合结论表明ꎬ投资者关心公司基于市场化程度的地理分布ꎬ印证了公司可以通过弥补新兴市场基础设施真空并获得成功的逻辑ꎬ这一策略并不会牺牲公司的长期创新活动ꎬ对一带一路国策提供了支持型的经验证据ꎮ
【基金】教育部人文社科重点研究重大项目（16JJD790038）
（12）非正式信息传递机制能降低公司权益融资成本吗？——基于企业家微博的实证检验
《财经研究》，46卷11期，孙彤(外),薛爽,徐佳怡(学)
【摘要】移动互联网时代,社交媒体日渐成为信息传递的重要渠道。作为社交媒体之一的微博为企业家从幕后走向台前提供了一条低成本且极便捷的通道。不同于以主流媒体为代表的正式信息传递机制,企业家微博具有明显的非正式特征。文章研究了企业家微博这一非正式信息传递机制对企业权益融资成本的影响。结果表明:(1)企业家微博发布与其所在企业的权益融资成本显著负相关。微博发布条数、评论条数以及转发条数越多,企业权益融资成本下降越明显。(2)企业家微博对权益融资成本的影响在市场化程度低的地区以及企业外部信息环境薄弱的情况下更加显著。(3)与企业不直接相关的个性化微博和与企业直接相关的披露式微博都与权益融资成本显著负相关,而个性化微博比例越高,越有利于降低权益融资成本。艾特(@)他人的数量越多,或者正向情感倾向的内容比例越高,企业权益融资成本下降越明显。在自媒体快速发展的时代,文章丰富了非正式信息传递机制经济后果的研究,为企业家选择信息传递方式和渠道提供了重要参考。
【基金】教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目（18JJD790010）
（13）企业社会责任：“真心”抑或“幌子”？——基于高管内幕交易视角的研究
《金融研究》，2020年第9期，曾爱民(外),魏志华(外),张纯,左婉平(外)
【摘要】企业承担社会责任究竟是真心还是幌子?与现有研究聚焦于考察社会责任对企业行为的影响不同,本文基于高管个体行为视角,实证检验企业社会责任对高管个体证券交易行为的影响。基于2008～2014年中国沪深A股上市公司高管10338个内幕交易样本的实证结果显示:(1)企业承担社会责任不仅能抑制高管内幕交易的规模,更能显著降低高管内幕交易获利性,这表明作为社会责任的谋划者,企业高管并未以社会责任为幌子牟取个人证券交易的私利,在一定程度上提供了企业真心承担社会责任的证据;(2)进一步从信息模型和声誉模型双重视角探究发现,在企业信息不透明和高管个人声誉较差的情况下,企业社会责任对高管内幕交易获利性的抑制作用更为显著;并且相较于高管个人声誉较差的情况,企业社会责任在信息不透明的情况下对高管内幕交易获利性的抑制作用更强。总之,本研究从高管个体行为视角提供了企业社会责任具有积极治理作用的证据,不仅丰富了企业承担社会责任经济后果的研究,同时,对利益相关者也具有实践指导意义。
（14）高质量审计与上市公司商誉泡沫
《审计研究》，2020.4，郭照蕊(外),黄俊
【摘要】基于我国资本市场A股上市公司2007～2017年数据,就高质量审计能否抑制公司商誉泡沫进行了实证检验。结果显示,选聘国际四大的上市公司相比选聘非国际四大的公司表现出更低的超额商誉,而且,其计提商誉减值的程度也更低,由此表明,高质量审计能够显著抑制公司商誉泡沫的产生。进一步的研究表明,非国有企业和市场化程度较高地区的企业,高质量审计对商誉泡沫的抑制作用更明显。最后,本文采用两阶段回归法、会计师事务所更换、超额商誉与审计质量重新计量等一系列方法进行了稳健性分析,主要结果未发生任何实质性变化。本文的研究增进了对商誉及商誉减值影响因素的了解,同时也提供了审计对企业内部管理发挥作用和价值的经验证据。
（15）Does Organisational Strategy Influence the Design of Equity Incentive Plans? Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
《中国会计与财务研究》，2020年12月第22卷第4期，王悦,周楠(学),高永靖(外),王析疑(外)
【摘要】This study examines how organisational strategy influences the design of performance-vested equity incentive plans. Prospectors have diverse product-market portfolios and keep exploring new prospects, while defenders rarely adjust their product-market portfolios and keep exploiting the existing markets. Therefore, compared with defenders, prospectors need to motivate managers to take higher risks and to have longer decision-making horizons. We expect that in order to motivate and supervise employees better, firms with different strategies will have different considerations when designing equity compensation. Specifically, this paper focuses on two parts of the design: the selection of incentive objects and the setting of attached performance targets. Using hand-collected data from performance-based equity incentive plans from Chinese public firms, we find that compared with defenders, prospectors focus more on motivating middle managers through their equity incentive plans. In addition, compared with defenders, prospectors set less difficult profit targets in their equity incentive plans; meanwhile, prospectors are more likely to set revenue targets for the purpose of emphasising market share. Our results are consistent with optimal contract theory: that is, an equity incentive plan is designed to be compatible with organisational strategy.
【基金】the Ministry of Education Funds for Key Research Institutes of Humanities and Social Sciences in Chinese Universities (No. 15JJD630008),
（上海财经大学会计与财务研究院办公室编印）