作者：刘凤委 谢诗蕾 赵文娟
关键字：盈余管理，经常性损益，非经常性损益，经常性可操纵利润
摘要/Abstract
上市公司与监管机构间的对策博弈历来是证券市场的特色之一，面对监管层的上有政策，上市公司总是能做到下有对策。本文通过关注T族公司（被实施ST、PT的上市公司）撤销特别处理标志的政策变化，发现线下项目的盈余在得到严格监管下，公司会通过增加线上项目的利润调控实现盈余管理的目的；同时公司还会利用监管政策的不完善主动调节业务范围，实现对经常性损益的操纵。本文的结论可以为今后政策的完善提供经验启示，以使政府和上市公司之间的博弈均衡逐渐由次优向最优发展。
The game played by the Chinese regulatory institutions and the listed companies is one of the special characteristics of Chinese security market. The listed companies can always find ways to counteract the policies issued by the regulator which is aimed at the stability and the efficiency of the market. This paper is focused on the earnings management behaviors of ST or PT companies during their repealing of ST or PT titles. We discover that our sample companies have achieved their goals of earnings management via the earnings manipulation of above-the-bottom-line items, while the earnings of under-the-bottom-line are under strict supervisions. Those manipulations of discretional regular earnings are carried out by the companies making use of the pretermissions of regulatory polices and actively shifting the range of their major operations. Our finding offers some empirical enlightenment on the improvement of regulatory policies, which is the essential to the optimal balance between the goals of regulators and the listed companies.