作者：邓淑芳,陈晓,姚正春
摘要/Abstract
本研究探讨了控制权转让市场中公司的层级结构、终极所有权与知情人交易之间的关系,结果发现公司的终极所有权属性与知情人交易有着显著的相关关系,当收购人为民营企业时，收购信息进入股价的速度要明显的慢于中央国有企业收购人，而当收购人为中央国有企业时，收购信息进入股价的速度又明显的慢于地方国有企业收购人,这表明地方国有企业的信息泄漏问题最为严重。出乎意外的是，公司的层级结构与知情人交易之间没有显著关系,这可能意味着收购等重大事件的决策权集中在控制链最上层企业及其控制人手中，下层企业只是执行这些决策的工具。
In this study, we are looking forward to gauge the systematic difference among different takeover events on informed trading and the factors that contributes to this difference. Two factors are in concern: corporate layers and ultimate ownership.We find significant association between ultimate ownership and the weight of informed trading. Informed trading is more serious when the bidder is a government owned corporations than when it is a family owned enterprise. Furthermore, central government corporations have less information leakage than local government corporations. What surprise us is that corporate layer has nothing to do with informed transaction. The findings implicit that corporations on the most upper layer may maintain the right to make critical decisions while the direct bidders are only the enforcement tool.