作者：朱凯, 陈信元
摘要/Abstract
本文以Watts（2003）的契约理论为基础，分析股东与债权人之间利益冲突对会计信息稳健性的影响。虽然会计信息稳健性有助于保护债权人的利益，但是股东如果可以作为公司的债权人，则投资者对会计信息稳健性的需求下降。本文 采用Basu（1997）模型分析了2004年中国上市公司会计信息稳健性，发现国家控制的上市公司的会计信息稳健性程度较低，而民营控制的上市公司会计信息稳健性程度较高，但是股东特征对会计信息稳健性的影响，随着银行在公司中利益的增加而趋于一致。
This paper analyzes the effect of conflict between shareholders and creditors on the accounting conservatisms, based on the contract approach proposed by Watts (2003). This paper argues that if shareholders are also the creditor of the firm, then the demand for conservatisms will decrease. Based on the Basu(1997) model, we find that the accounting information in corporations controlled by state owners is less conservatism than the one by private owners. However, the effect of characteristics of shareholders on conservatism is diminishing when the creditor stake become more important.