作者：薛爽
摘要/Abstract
本文以1994年到2003年6月受到证监会处罚的62家公司为样本，研究了上市公司违规行为的特点以及违规的收益与成本。研究发现，受到处罚的违规行为主要集中在欺诈上市、上市后提供虚假信息、在信息披露时有重大遗漏、违规买卖炒作股票或改变募集资金用途等几个方面。违规行为给违规者带来的利益巨大，付出的成本却很小。违规行为的成本小于违规收益的原因在于：证监会对违规行为的处罚力度不大；在既有的制度背景下，违规行为被发现的可能性比较小；违规收益的获得者和成本承担者相背离等。
Based on the 62 firms punished by Chinese Regulatory Commission (CSRC) during 1994 and June, 2003, I study the characteristics, benefits and costs of violating behavior conducted by listed firms. I find that the punished behavior by CSRC focuses on fraudulent IPO, publishing mendacious information, trading illegally and change the usage of raising funds. The cost of violating behavior is smaller than the benefits due to the following reason: firstly, the penalty of CRSC is piddling; secondly, under the existing monitoring environment, the probability of which the violation can be found is small; and lastly, the cost of punishment is not totally undertaken by the actor of violating behavior.