作者：朱红军
摘要/Abstract
自股权分置改革以来，定向增发开始成为中国资本市场权益再融资的重要方式之一。本文研究了定向增发的高额折价及其形成原因。研究结果显示，大股东的机会主义行为和上市公司与投资者之间的信息不对称是定向增发折价的重要原因。我们发现，当大股东购买定向增发股票的比例与其在增发前持有的上市公司股权比例差额越大时，特别地，当其完全购买增发的股票时，则增发的折价越高，并且增发价格相对于基准价格的溢价越低。这一结果表明，大股东通过定向增发实现了以较低的对价稀释中小股东权益的目的，从而在一定程度上侵害了后者的利益。此外，与国外的研究一致，定向增发的折价还与信息不对称的程度成正比，即当不对称的程度越高时，增发的折价也越高，而增发价格相对于基准价格的溢价越低。本文的研究对于完善尚处于不断改进中的定向增发操作规范具有一定的启示意义。
Private placement has become one of the most important financial channels in china since Split Share Structure Reform. This paper examines why private placements of equity are associated with substantial discounts in china. We find that large shareholder's opportunity behavior and information asymmetry between company and outsider investors may be the two major explanations for the discount. The results show that when shares that large shareholder purchases exceed their ownership before private placement, the discount is higher. This means large shareholder may dilute small shareholder's ownership at low cost through private placement. In other words, large shareholder may tunnel through private placement. In addition, we find that when the information asymmetry is severe, the discount is higher. Our paper may have some implications for policy makers of private placement in china.