作者：赵子夜
摘要/Abstract
DeAngelo(1981)的准租理论指出，客户的专有性准租可能会诱发审计方的机会主义，但事务所因机会主义而遭受的损失与已有业务量正相关，客户精明的洞察了这一点，从而以事务所的业务规模来替代审计质量的水准。本文以中国审计市场特殊的“取缔从业资格”式监管事件为切入点，考察事务所是否在惩戒效应下根据自身的业务量来权衡机会主义的得失。就这一事件的市场反应而言，本文发现，未受处罚的事务所的审计业务量越高，其客户的短期财富效应也越好，并且，这种财富优势在小额赢利的风险型公司中更为明显。这说明对于已具备业务量优势的事务所而言，其客户更看好监管带来的保护效应，也暗示在审计行业自律和外部监管的协同治理下，会计师事务所受到的约束力与其业务量相关。综合结论有助于我们理解新兴审计市场中准租效应的实现路径，以及监管所起到的积极作用。
DeAngelo(1981) posits that when auditors earn quasirents from clients, auditors with more clients have more to lose by punishment of opportunistic reports. This paper tests “quasirent” effect in “Disqualification Event” in China’s audit market. I find that auditors with more clients have higher CAR than the others. This statistic result is stronger in test using samples with small profit. Taken together, the results show that the pressure issued by regulation is positively related with scale of audit business and consumers take advantage in valuation of auditors with more clients. Rational consumers take scale of auditors’ business as proxy of audit quality.