作者：陈冬华，章铁生，李翔
摘要/Abstract
本文从我国法律环境薄弱的转型制度环境出发，将管制视为法律机制欠缺的衍生机制，从理论上分析了，管制权力可能外溢，构成隐性契约。依据上述理论，以我国IPO遴选管制权为例，本文认为，证券管制机构在各地区间分配IPO资源时，会考虑各地区上市公司发生丑闻的频率和严重程度。证券管制机构的这一做法，并无明文规定，属于管制权力的外溢效应，这是一种无形的游戏规则，事实上形成了隐性契约。地方政府出于自身理性，会做出履行与否以及履行多少的对策。上述理论分析，得到了经验证据的支持。本文为理解转型经济中的政府管制作用、契约形式和投资者保护提供了新的发现和证据。
In Chinese transition economy, government regulation could be a substitute for the lack of law mechanism and regulator’s power could spill over into other areas not regulated. Then, theoretically it could construct implicit contracts. For example, CSRC has the rights to choose IPO firms among applicants. It might construct implicit contracts between CSRC and local governments if the former consider the frequency and the consequences of the scandals among different areas. Local governments could make decisions to whether to implement and how much to implement the implicit contracts. The above theoretical predictions are supported by our empirical evidence.