作者：王琨，肖星
摘要/Abstract
本文采用中国上市公司终极控股结构的数据检验了以下三个问题：（1）国有终极控股公司的普遍性；（2）国家控股上市公司的股权结构；（3）以国家控股上市公司为样本，检验终极股权结构对公司价值的影响。研究发现，70%的上市公司最终控制人是国家政府部门。国家直接或者通过国有企业集团间接控制这些上市公司。以往研究发现政府干预引发的政治成本以及缺乏监管产生的管理层代理问题都对企业业绩有负面影响。本文的实证结果显示公司价值随着政府与企业分离程度的增加而提高，说明现阶段政府干预成本显著高于代理成本，进一步减少政府对企业经营的干预有助于公司的发展。
Using data on ultimate controlling structures of Chinese listed companies, we identify three issues in this article: (1) how common is the listed companies held by the state ultimately? (2) how does the state maintain the control of these companies? (3) the impacts of different controlling structures on firm value. It’s found that more than 70% of Chinese listed companies are ultimately owned by the state and controlled by government. The government controls the listed companies directly or indirectly through solely state-owned enterprises mainly. Taking into account the trade-off between political costs and agency costs, we find that firm value increases with the separation between the listed company and the government.