作者：王兰芳 王苏生
摘要/Abstract
本文探讨了分期投资中广泛使用的可转换债券对于处理企业重要事件的作用。虽然分期投资可能会引发风险和激励问题，但它仍然在公司融资中被广泛使用。通过模型分析，本文发现在分期投资中使用可转换债券可以使投资者几乎达到最优状态。另外，风险因素可以通过向管理者施加压力而降低代理成本。这些结论可以解释为什么在现实中可转换债券是分歧投资中的一种主要工具。
This paper investigates a popular phenomenon in which the manager of a firm uses
convertibles in staged financing. Staged financing is particularly popular in corporate finance,
even although it has potential incentive and risk problems. This paper finds many interesting
properties of convertibles in staged financing, including the fact that staged financing using
convertibles can almost achieve the first best. We also find that risks can reduce agency costs
by putting pressure on the manager to perform. These results may explain why convertibles
are a popular instrument in staged financing in reality.