作者：陈运森;朱松;王玉涛
摘要/Abstract
本文从声誉受损的角度出发，实证检验了声誉在企业-银行关系中发挥的直接和间接作用。研究结果发现：上市公司在声誉受损后获得的银行借款增量减少，借款成本上升；与声誉未受损公司相比，声誉受损公司获得的银行借款增量较低，借款成本更高。除上述这种直接影响外，声誉还通过改变银行跟企业稳定的“业绩-银行借款”关系来间接影响银行借款政策。进一步的研究还发现市场环境的差异也会影响声誉作用的发挥。本研究说明，声誉作为企业与利益相关者长期重复博弈的重要机制和非正式制度，影响了合约的制定和执行。处在新兴加转轨经济中的中国企业必须注重声誉的积累，从而节约各种交易成本。
By focusing on the reputation damage to listed companies in China, we investigate that the reputation plays the direct and indirect role in reducing the transaction cost between the company and the bank. The empirical evidence shows that after the financial fraud, firms’ bank loan will be less than before and also less than firms with no reputation damage; while the interests of the loan would be higher than before and even higher than their counterparties. Moreover, the reputation plays an indirect role via influencing the “performance-bank loans” relation. Additional test shows limited evidence that the institutional environment would influence the reputation effect on bank loans. Our results suggest that the reputation, an important mechanism of the long-term repeated game with stakeholders, affects the making and implement process of contracts, and firms should pay more attention to their reputations in order to reduce the transaction cost.