作者：薛爽，叶飞腾，付迟
摘要/Abstract
本文旨在研究行业专长对签字会计师审计任期与审计质量关系的影响。利用签字会计师强制轮换制度实施之前的1998-2002年上市公司数据，研究发现，会计师审计任期能够提高审计质量，但主要是体现在签字会计师缺乏行业专长的时候。而当会计师行业专长增加时审计任期与审计质量之间的正相关关系受到削弱。这说明，当会计师缺少行业经验时，审计任期延长带来的客户专有知识效应超过了独立性降低的负面效应。而当会计师具有较多行业经验时，审计任期延长带来的独立性降低的负面效应相对于客户专有知识带来的正面效应则更加显著。
This paper studies how partner level industry expertise affects the relationship between partners’ tenure and audit quality. Using a sample of listed companies in China stock market from 1998 to 2002 which is before the effect of mandatory rotation of signed auditor, we find that when partners who sign the auditing reports have less expertise, their tenure is positively related to audit quality. But partners’ industry expertise decreases this positive relationship. That is, for partners with less industry expertise, client-specific knowledge is more important than independence-decreasing effect. But for partners with more industry expertise, effect of client-specific knowledge is much more decreased and independence-decreasing effect becomes comparatively important.