作者： 蔡祥，张海燕，蔡键敏
摘要/Abstract
本文以邯郸钢铁的股权分置改革为研究对象，分析了公司在这一过程中的盈余管理以及股价操纵行为。我们发现，由于作为主要对价的认购权证行权与否是邯钢集团捍卫控股权的关键因素，邯钢集团试图通过盈余管理压低股价，以阻止认购权证行权，从而应对潜在的控股权危机。但由于股市整体上涨趋势等客观原因，其盈余管理最终未能阻止认购权证的行权，股权遭到了稀释。本文的分析结果表明，随着股改的深入，大股东将更为关心二级市场的股价，同时更可能利用盈余管理进行股价操纵。本文的结果还意味着，盈余管理目标的实现需要环境的配合，并不是所有的盈余管理都可以实现其既定的意图。
Using the share structure reform of Handan Iron and Steel （HDIS） as research object, this study examined earnings management and price manipulation of HDIS during the exercise period of warrants. We find that, since warrants is critical in control rights of HDIS, HDIS conduct earnings manipulation to lower the stock price, thus prohibiting the exercise of warrants and keeping the control rights. Due to the big bull market, HDIS fail to keep the price lower than the threshold, and investors exercise the warrants, as a result, the control right has been diluted. Our study suggests that controlling shareholders will show more concern about stock price as share structure reform goes on, and earnings management will be widely used as a way to manipulate price. Besides, our results are consistent with the efficiency of capital market, that is, investors can tell the incentive under earnings manipulation, and conduce to the failure of manipulation.