作者：王凤华
摘要/Abstract
本文把产品市场竞争、高管激励、盈余管理置于一个统一的分析框架内，研究了前二者对盈余管理的影响，并结合我国上市公司产权性质，对国有上市公司和非国有上市公司中这种影响关系的差异进行了系统比较。实证研究发现，考虑了高管激励的内生性特征后，高管激励能够显著改善上市公司的盈余管理行为，但不同产权上市公司在面对产品市场竞争时，对高管激励手段的选择不同，具体为国有上市公司偏好于选择增加现金薪酬，而非国有上市公司偏好于选择股权激励。本文结论表明：完善产品市场竞争的制度建设，是改善上市公司高管激励效果，抑制盈余管理的重要手段。
Based on the balanced panel data of Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2008, this paper compares different property listed companies’ choose of incentive to senior manager when product market competition become severe, and the influence of different means of incentives to earnings information management. Conclusions show that different property listed company choose different method to stimulate his Senior Manager when face increasing product market competition. In the concrete, state-owned listed companies prefer to cash compensation to stimulate his senior manager, while share incentive is non-state-owned listed companies’ preference. After considering senior manager incentive is endogenous of product market competition, senior manager incentive methods can significantly improve the earnings information management.