作者：王霞
关键字：政府干预；并购；价值创造
摘要/Abstract
本文以上海市政府控股的国有上市公司2006-2011年发生的并购行为为样本，研究了地方政府干预对并购价值效应的影响。结果发现：虽然上海市政府控股的上市公司长期市场表现没有显著优于对照公司，但是，并购在短期内产生了正的财富效应，若干窗口下的累计超额收益显著高于对照样本。研究结果表明上海市政府为推进“四个中心”建设所采取的剥离不良资产、整合优质资产、提升地方国企证券化率的系列政策措施在一定程度得到了市场投资者的认同，为股东实现了价值创造。这同时表明，在政府的多元目标导向下，地方政府不必然以牺牲企业绩效为代价换取社会目标与政治目标的实现，相反，政府对企业的适度干预反而有助于并购的价值创造。
Based on the M&A cases of listed state-owned companies controlled by the Shanghai local government from 2006 to 2011, we examine the effects of local government intervention on the performance of local government-controlled acquirers. We find that local government intervention has a positive impact on the performance of local government-controlled acquirers whose cumulative abnormal return is higher than that of matched samples in some short investigating windows. The results show that the M&A policies to promote the construction of “four centers” of Shanghai local government has created positive value for investors, and the result also show that the appropriate government intervention is useful for the M&A value creation.