作者：郑琦，薛爽
摘要/Abstract
本文系统地回顾了承销商自主配售新股的文献，这些文献分别从信息吸引观和代理问题观来研究和解释自主配售的经济后果。信息吸引观认为承销商利用自主配售权回报那些为新股定价提供有用信息的投资者以获取定价相关的信息。代理问题观认为承销商利用自主配售权和投资者进行利益交换以达到自利的目的。在对文献全面梳理的基础上，本文对两类研究的关系、可能存在的问题等进行了述评。我国目前还不允许承销商自主配售新股，而给予承销商自主配售新股权利是未来新股发售机制改革方向之一。论文就此提出了相关政策建议，以期对承销商自主配售新股的政策制订有所借鉴。
This paper reviews the literature on the topic of underwriters allocate new issues discriminatorily. There are two streams to explain the economic consequence of discriminatory allocation. The information revelation theories regard the allocation of new issues as an inducement to elicite information from investors who know the value of the firm more than others. The principal-agent model highlights the potential for agency problems between the invest bank and the issuing firm and underwriters using allocation right to exchange interest for themselves . This paper compares the two streams of studies and discusses the potential problems. The invest banks in China could not allocate new issues as they wish at the present. Giving the underwriters the right to allocate new issues discriminatorily might be the next step of the IPO reform in China, and this paper gives some policy suggestions to keep the reform playing a positive role.
全文阅读：https://www.sinoss.net/qikan/2013/0618/13454.html