作者：侯青川，靳庆鲁，张佩佩，张曼
摘要/Abstract
本文以2003-2012年沪深两地A股上市公司为研究样本，首先考察了管理层持股对公司投资决策的影响，然后从实物期权角度探讨了管理层持股对公司增长和清算期权价值的影响。另外，我们还结合我国的特殊制度背景，进一步考察了不同股权性质情况下，管理层持股对公司投资以及公司期权价值的影响。本文的研究发现，管理层持股显著增加了管理层的投资灵活性，并且这种影响最终体现到了投资者对公司的权益定价之中，即增加了公司增长和清算期权的价值。进一步的分析表明，这种影响主要存在于民营企业。
Based on the 2003-2012 and a-share listed companies as research samples, we first examine the effect of management equity investment decisions on the company, and then, from the aspect of real option, to explore the impact of management shareholding on the value of the company's growth andliquidation option. In addition, we also combined with the special system background of our country and further examine the different nature of equity, management equity investment and the option value to the company. In this paper, the research found that management shareholding significantly increases the investment flexibility, and this is finally reflected in the rights and interests of investors on the company's pricing, which increase the value of company's growth and the liquidation option. Further analysis indicates that the impact mainly exist in the private enterprises.