作者：Jun-Koo Kang, Huifang Yin, and Huai Zhang
关键字：Accountingconservatism;Informationsymmetry;Corporategovernance;Blockacquisitions;Outsidedirector.
摘要/Abstract
Using a large sample of block share acquisitions in the U.S. from 1980 to 2007, we examine the effect of target accounting conservatism on block acquirers’ monitoring activities. Wefind that acquirers of targets with higher conservatism are more likely to have their representatives on the targets’ boards after block share purchasesthan are block acquirers of targets with lower conservatism. Moreover, there is a positive and significant relation between target conservatism and target abnormal announcement returns (post-acquisition operating performance). These results are more pronounced when acquirers do not hold any equity ownership in the targets prior to the block acquisitions,or whenacquirers purchase targets withgreater ex ante information asymmetry. To the extent that accounting conservatism reduces information asymmetry between managers and outside investors,and reduced information asymmetry results in lower monitoring costs, our results suggest that target conservatism increases block acquirers’ incentives to monitor the target.
全文阅读：https://www.sinoss.net/qikan/2015/0121/13938.html