作者：Xin Chang,Jun-koo Kang,and Wen rui Zhang
关键字：Pensiondeficits;Marketforcorporatecontrol;Mergersandacquisitions;Mergerannouncementreturns;Disciplinaryrole
摘要/Abstract
This paper examines the disciplinary role of corporate pension deficits in the market for corporatecontrol. Wefindthatcompanieswithlargerpensiondeficitsarelesslikelytoengage in diversifyingmergers,experiencehighermergerannouncementreturns,paylowerpremiumsto targets,andusea higherpercentageof cashintheirpayment. Theseresultsaremoreevidentfor acquirerswithpensionplansthataredominatedbyactivelyworkingemployeesorcollectively bargainedby employees.Our findingsindicatethat corporatepensiondeficits provideemployees with strong incentives tomonitor managerial performance and influence managers tomake value-enhancinginvestmentdecisions.
全文阅读：https://www.sinoss.net/qikan/2015/0127/13947.html