作者：孙刚，叶楠
关键字：绩效考核、盈余管理、国有企业考核指标
摘要/Abstract
本文研究了企业高管绩效考核指标对盈余管理的影响。以2004年中央国资委颁布并实施《中央企业负责人业绩考核暂行办法》开启国企负责人绩效考核新阶段为切入点，考察“业绩上、薪酬上，业绩下、薪酬下的职务任免考核原则对企业负责人的盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现，《考核办法》的实施至少没有显著降低国有企业盈余管理水平。根据广东地区国企相对于其他地区在考核指标体系上的差异，进一步考察发现采用盈余保障倍数考核指标的广东地区国企相较于其他地区，盈余管理程度较低。对于企业负责人来说，《考核办法》的颁布只是将薪酬契约更加明确化和统一化，但对国企负责人的盈余管理行为激励或约束的效用没有存在显著差异，所以在2004年《考核办法》实施前后国有企业的盈余管理程度并没有发生显著变化，盈余指标也没有得到显著改善。
The paper studies performance appraisal of executives on earning management. SASAC issued “the rules for state-owned management’ performance appraisal” in 2004, which entered into a new stage of performance management. With the principle that compensation and promotion is based on enterprises’ performance, how could compensation contract impel and limit the managements’ behavior of earnings management? Based on the theory and rules, this paper proposes two assumptions: one is that the conduct of “the rules of performance appraisal” at least not reduces the extent of earnings management in state-owned enterprises; another is that the state-owned enterprise in Guangdong using the earnings coverage ratio has lower extent of earnings management, compared with other areas.
全文阅读：https://www.sinoss.net/qikan/2015/0121/13944.html