作者：侯青川，靳庆鲁，陈明端
关键字：政府代理问题；公司代理问题；经济发展；公司发展
摘要/Abstract
本文基于政府代理问题与公司代理问题，试图厘清宏观经济环境对微观企业行为影响的传导路径。本文发现，市场化进程较低时，政府代理问题突出表现为地方政府通过在资源配置中向国有企业倾斜以实现经济粗放型增长，使得国有企业在经济发展过程中以外延型增长为主，具体表现为企业规模的扩张与经济发展之间的相关性更强。市场化进程提高，上述政府代理问题会有所缓解，非国有企业的制度安排更有助于减少公司代理问题，实现企业从外延型增长向内涵型增长转变，具体表现为非国有企业盈利能力提高与经济发展之间的相关性更强。
This paper studies the relationship between economic growth and corporate performance from the perspective of the agency problem of government and of corporate. This paper intends to clarify the path through which the macroeconomic environments affect the micro corporate performance. In regions of low marketization, local governments have more discretion to allocate economic resources toward SOEs, and thus the agency problem of government exacerbates. In terms of growth, SOEs tend to focus on scale. The empirical findings indicate that for SOEs, the relation between sales growth and GDP growth is stronger than that for Non-SOEs. In regions of high marketization, the agency problem of governmentalleviates, and the organizational infrastructures of Non-SOEs can mitigate the agency problem of corporate, and thus the corporate puts more weight on intensive growth (earnings) rather than extensive growth(scale). Accordingly, the relation between earnings growth and GDP growth is stronger for Non-SOEs.
全文阅读：https://www.sinoss.net/qikan/2015/0121/13943.html