作者：万华林，史莉莉
关键字：独立董事；监督；经济后果；审计意见类型；审计收费
摘要/Abstract
本文以2004年至2009年A股上市公司作为大样本，对独立董事监督的经济后果进行了实证分析。本文选择样本期间异议公司与规模相当的同行业同年度非异议对照公司样本进行比较,并观测了异议事件前后三年的数据，选用审计意见类型和审计收费作为相关衡量指标分析了独立董事积极履责行为所产生的经济后果。研究表明，异议事件并非导致公司出具非标意见的重要因素；在独立董事公开异议事件后，异议公司审计师提高了审计收费。这表明，独立董事公开异议传递了额外的公司风险信息，会计师事务所审计收费中收取了异议公司的风险溢价。
Based on 2004-2009 A-share listed companies as the big sample, we make an empirical analysis of the economic consequences of independent director's supervision. This article chooses samples during the objection to company with similar size in the same year, compares them with each other, and observes the objection to events before and after three years of data, selecting the types of audit opinions and audit fees as indicators of related analysis of the independent directors actively take responsibility behavior generated by the economic consequences. Studies have shown that objection does not lead to the company issued by the opinions of non-standard important factor but lead to the increase of audit fees. This suggests that the independent director’s public objection is regarded as the additional information ofthe risk of the company, and certified public accountants increase audit fees to include the company's risk premium.
全文阅读：https://www.sinoss.net/qikan/2015/0121/13941.html