【报告主题】To benefit or Signal? Insider trading and contract redactions
【主讲嘉宾】苏黎新，香港理工大学会计与金融学院院系主任
【报告时间】2025年5月13日 14:00
【报告地点】会计学院108室
【内容提要】
Using regular SEC filings filed between July 2008 and December 2018 with and without redacted contracts, we document that insiders trade on the redacted private information and that insider selling activities appear to be more pronounced and last longer than insider buying activities. We further find that insider sales are linked to significantly higher profits over the subsequent six months, particularly when the redacted contracts relate to R&D, license and royalty, when the firm possesses bad news or trade secrets. By contrast, insider buys are likely to happen only when the firm experienced an increase in bid-ask spread and lower abnormal returns before the redacted contract filing, and insider buys on average are not profitable, suggesting insider buys are to signal firm prospects rather than to exploit information advantage for personal gains. Overall, we offer interesting evidence on the interplay between strategic (non)disclosure and insider trading in a mandatory disclosure setting.