【报告主题】Strategic Disclosure of Hiring Information and Insider Trading: Evidence from Job Postings
【主讲嘉宾】程林，中欧国际工商学院会计学教授、金融学/会计学系系主任
【报告时间】2025年3月11日 14:00
【报告地点】会计学院108室
【内容提要】
Using a near-universe sample of job postings from 2010 to 2020, we find that managers disclose good news of job demand before insider trading so that they could sell securities in higher price immediately following the disclosure. However, we do not find such strategic behavior before insider purchases. We further show that the baseline effects are accentuated for managers with more incentives to exploit trading profits and more discretions in information disclosure, but attenuated for firms with higher proprietary costs and labor market frictions, and better governance efficacy. Additional tests show that managers engage in a two-pronged approach to manipulate both accruals and job postings to maximize trading profits. Our findings are robust to several sensitivity checks, including the difference-in-differences research design, different matching methods, alternative measures, trading windows, and samples.