【报告主题】Propagation of ESG-Linked Compensation through Boardroom Connections
【主讲嘉宾】Izidin El Kalak，卡迪夫大学金融学副教授
【报告时间】2024年11月26日 10:00
【报告地点】会计学院108室
【内容提要】
ESG-linked compensation policies propagate through common directors, impacting firm-level environmental innovation performance. Using a sample of U.S. listed firms during 2002-2020, we show that a firm is 2.7% more likely to implement ESG-pay policy if its board-connected peers have adopted it. This result is robust to alternative model specifications and an IV approach that uses ESG contracting of the peers of peers as an instrument. We show that these peer effects are more pronounced when common directors act as CEO in the focal firms, independent in the interlocked firms and are members of the compensation committees. In addition, the peer effects are more pronounced when the common directors have more power and when the focal firms with better board quality, more care about ESG issues, under higher level of information asymmetry and face more competition pressure.