【报告主题】ESG Performance and Top Executive Promotion
【主讲嘉宾】李东辉，深圳大学经济学院会计与金融学教授
【报告时间】2024年10月22日 14:00
【报告地点】会计学院108室
【内容提要】
Based on a sample of the listed 1,456 Chinese State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) with 33,242 firm-year observations spanning the years 2010 to 2023, by manually tracking top executives’ (Chairmen and CEOs) subsequent employment records, we have found that their past ESG performance facilitates their future promotion (e.g., political promotion, or working in a larger firm, or having a higher position or higher pay). It has also been documented that there is a reduced pay for both financial and ESG performance sensitivity for executives with political promotion, and SOE’s better financial performance can strengthen the positive impact of ESG performance on top executive promotions. Furthermore, we conduct three moderating analysis and find that external attention by financial analysts can attenuate this impact except for political promotion, while corruption governance can also attenuate this impact especially for political promotion. Meanwhile, provincial environmental governance plays a positive moderating role. After a full range of heterogeneity analysis, interesting differential results enrich our findings. Overall, our results suggest that SOEs’ ESG performance enhances top executives’ labor market potentials.