【报告主题】Enhanced bank monitoring ability and corporate voluntary disclosure: Evidence from public credit registries
【主讲嘉宾】陈旸旸，香港城市大学教授
【报告时间】2023年12月25日 14:00
【报告地点】会计学院108室
【内容提要】
Exploiting the country-level mandatory adoption of public credit registries (PCRs), which improve banks’ ability to monitor borrowers through sharing their credit information among banks, we document a negative impact of enhanced bank monitoring ability on firms’ decisions to voluntarily provide management forecasts. Consistent with expectations, we find that this impact is larger for PCRs that share more information, have greater transparency, and are under more stringent regulations. The impact also intensifies for firms exhibiting higher accounting quality and in countries where banks have stronger monitoring incentives and regulatory institutions better protect creditors’ claims. Additionally, enhanced bank monitoring ability reduces the informativeness of firms’ disclosure. Collectively, we provide robust evidence implying that enhanced bank monitoring ability engenders substitution of shareholder monitoring by bank monitoring, which helps resolve agency problems and reduces shareholders’ demand for public disclosure for monitoring purposes.