【报告主题】Can Mandatory Disclosure Substitute for Relationship-Based Financing? Evidence from China's Bond Market
【主讲嘉宾】丁一，香港中文大学（深圳）
【报告时间】2026年11月17日 14:00
【报告地点】会计学院108室
【内容提要】
We examine whether mandatory disclosure can substitute for relationship-based financing using China’s 2019 industry-specific bond disclosure reform. In a difference-in-differences design, we find that mandatory disclosure increases bond allocations to unconnected and small institutional investors, with larger effects when disclosure requirements are more extensive and pre-reform disclosure gaps are greater. The effects vary with issuer credit quality and reliance on investor relationships. Among highly rated, relationship-dependent issuers, purchases by unconnected investors increase, while purchases by connected investors decline. Among lower-rated, relationship-dependent issuers, this pattern reverses. The reform also reduces issuance credit spreads and bond overpricing and is associated with lower subsequent default and downgrade probabilities. These improvements coincide with reduced bond issuance by lower-rated and unlisted firms. Overall, our findings suggest that mandatory disclosure facilitates arm’s-length investment and improves bond pricing, but its ability to substitute for relationship-based financing depends on issuer credit quality. Public information substitutes for connected financing among stronger issuers but may reinforce reliance on connected investors among weaker, relationship-dependent issuers.